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1.Introduction 
Ever since the Kyoto protocol, developed countries such as the United States, Japan 
and several European countries started implementing policies and programs to attain the CO2 
emission targets committed in the protocol. One of the targeted sectors for these initiatives is 
the transportation sector. According to a 2015 study by the EPA,1 the transportation sector in 
the United States accounts for 27% of all greenhouse gas emissions, second only to the 
electricity sector that accounts for 29%. Within the transportation sector, 60% of total 
emissions are due to light-duty vehicles.2  In the case of Japan, according to a 2015 study by 
JCCCA,3 the transportation sector contributes 17% of direct CO2 emission and 17% of indirect 
CO2 emissions. The case for Japan is less severe in terms of transportation sector emissions but 
it is still not negligible.  
The Japanese government have introduced several subsidies, tax cuts and green tax 
programs aimed at the passenger vehicle market. The goal of most of these polices is to 
encourage consumers to buy vehicles that emit less CO2, also called environment-friendly 
vehicles. Some policies targeted the transport sector indirectly, such as subsidizing the initial 
cost of charging stations for electric vehicles. Considering the various types of policies aimed 
at passenger vehicles, there is no doubt that understanding the impact of such policies is 
important for promoting these vehicles.  
In this study, we will empirically analyze policies either directly or indirectly aimed at 
environment-friendly vehicles in the Japanese market. Having a diversity of incentives for 
different levels of environment-friendly vehicles makes the Japanese automobile market a good 
candidate for our empirical analysis. We will cover three major topics in this paper: the effect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions 
'!A vehicle with a weight of 3,500kg or less.!
( http://www.jccca.org/chart/chart04_04.html!
!'!
of tax incentives on sales of environment-friendly vehicles; the impact of charging 
infrastructure on sales electric vehicles; and the relationship between catalogue fuel efficiency 
and real fuel efficiency.  
In the Chapter 2, we will study the tax incentives that were introduced in the Japanese 
market in 2009 and aimed at environment-friendly vehicles. Our objective is to see how much 
did the tax incentives contributed to that sharp increase of the sales of environment-friendly 
vehicles observed after the introduction of the tax incentives. The tax incentives constitute of 
tax cuts and subsidies for buying an environment-friendly vehicle. We will use the sales data 
of the top selling 30 vehicles in Japan and regress it on variables representing the tax cuts and 
subsidies alongside other control variables such as car price, gasoline price and income per 
capita. The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, we use many different ranges for 
environment-friendly vehicles. From hybrid-electric vehicles to other vehicles that are less fuel 
efficient but still fall under the environment-friendly vehicle category. Second, the structure of 
the tax incentives in Japan allows us to test direct tax cuts at the point of purchase that range 
from total tax exemptions to a 50% tax cut. The results show that tax cuts were the most 
significant contributor to the increase of sales of environment-friendly vehicles. Subsidies 
came second and other factors such as gasoline price weren’t as significant of a determinant 
for the sample. 
In Chapter 3, we examine the role of charging infrastructure investment in promoting 
the sales of electric vehicles. Electric vehicles emit less carbon dioxide than other environment-
friendly vehicles, including hybrid-electric vehicles. This is conditional on the amount of CO2 
emissions that is generated from electricity production. In the case of Japan, even considering 
that, electric vehicle emissions are lower. There are many hurdles that must be overcome for 
the sales of electric vehicles to increase. One hurdle is that many consumers consider electric 
vehicles as new technology and they are not willing to risk buying something that has not been 
!(!
tested thoroughly. Another hurdle is the driving range of an electric vehicle, which is shorter 
than other types of vehicles. This causes an anxiety for consumers of not being able to drive 
for long distances. This anxiety can be alleviated if there are enough charging stations for 
consumers to charge their vehicles. In 2009, the Japanese government introduced a policy that 
subsidized half of the cost of constructing a charging station. In this analysis, we estimate the 
effect of this policy on the sales of electric vehicles. We use the sales data of the Nissan leaf 
from 2011 and 2012 for 49 prefectures in Japan and regress it on the number of new charging 
stations that received the subsidy. We also use other control variables in the estimation such as 
gasoline price, electricity price and average driving distance for each region. The contribution 
of this study is twofold. First, we develop a simple theoretical model explaining the buying 
decision for a green consumer of an electric vehicle. Second, we use real sales data of electric 
vehicles to measure the effect of charging stations on the demand. The result shows that 
charging stations had a positive but modest effect on the sales of electric vehicles. Also, the 
result suggests that longer average driving distances affected sales of electric vehicles 
negatively. This shows that consumers in regions with longer driving distances were buying 
less electric vehicles, which suggests that the range anxiety effect is stronger than the fuel-cost 
saving and potential CO2 abatement effect from driving an electric vehicle. We also did a 
simple simulation of the abatement cost and found out that the abatement cost for subsidizing 
charging stations is more expensive that the other measures of abatement cost. However, this 
is conditional on the initial quantity of electric vehicle of the sample and the cost-effectiveness 
could be better with a larger initial quantity of electric vehicles. 
In Chapter 4, we explore the relationship between fuel efficiency and data manipulation. 
Policies for promoting environment-friendly vehicles define the performance based on 
catalogue fuel efficiency, or the fuel efficiency obtained from a lab test. According to research 
!)!
done by the European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E),4 a gap exists between 
fuel efficiencies experienced on-road by drivers and the fuel efficiencies that are obtained from 
lab tests. Although it is natural to see a gap due to driving behavior and other conditions, 
according to the study, there is a consistent pattern with this gap between real fuel efficiency 
and catalogue fuel efficiency that can be observed in the European countries included. The 
recent case of the Mitsubishi fuel efficiency manipulation suggests the possibility that 
automobile companies might manipulate the numbers that would simulate the on-road 
conditions in order to make fuel efficiency seem better in the test. The statistics from the study 
of T&E about the fuel efficiency gap might suggest that these manipulation incidents could be 
a widespread problem in Europe. This chapter aims to test whether this is true for the Japanese 
automobile market or not. We investigate this by empirically testing three hypotheses. First, 
we empirically confirm the Mitsubishi incident. Second, we test the hypothesis that a fuel 
efficiency gap exists in the Japanese automobile market as a whole. And finally, we test the 
hypothesis that a fuel efficiency gap exists for each carmaker individually. We use survey data 
collected by IDD, Inc. Group of real, on-road, fuel efficiency numbers. Regressing the numbers 
of real fuel efficiency on catalogue fuel efficiency that were obtained from the lab test and 
advertised by the carmakers gives us the average level of difference or gap that the market has. 
Then we regress real fuel efficiency on the same catalogue efficiency variable interacted with 
a production year variable indicating the year the vehicle in the observation was produced. By 
using this approach, we can see whether there is a widening fuel efficiency gap over time for 
the whole market. Finally, to answer the third question we regress real fuel efficiency on 
catalogue fuel efficiency interacted with the vehicle production year variable and a dummy 
variable indicating each carmaker. This allows us to understand whether there is a widening 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)!https://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/mind-gap-2015-closing-chasm-between-test-and-real-
world-car-co2-emissions 
!*!
fuel efficiency gap over time for each of the carmakers. The results suggest that we were able 
to empirically confirm the Mitsubishi incident. However, we could not find a widening fuel 
efficiency gap over time for neither the market as a whole nor for each carmaker. This suggests 
that widening fuel efficiency gap due to data manipulation could be an isolated case exclusive 
to the carmaker Mitsubishi. 
 The rest if the paper is organized as follows, in Chapter 2 we will examine the effect 
of tax incentives on environment friendly vehicles. In Chapter 3, we will focus on the 
relationship between charging infrastructure and electric vehicles. In Chapter 4, we will discuss 
the fuel efficiency gap and data manipulation. Finally, in Chapter 5, we will present the 
conclusion of the paper. 
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2. The Effect of Tax Incentives on Sales of Environment-
Friendly Vehicles 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The Tonnage and Acquisition Tax Cut for Environment-friendly Vehicles and the Eco-
Car Subsidy were introduced in Japan in April of 2009.5 The purpose of these policies is to 
mitigate climate change by reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases from automobiles. 
These tax incentives are designed to make environment-friendly vehicles, which include more 
expensive vehicles such as hybrid-electric vehicles, more appealing. This will result in the 
increase of the market share for environment-friendly vehicles replacing conventional vehicles. 
Another aim of these policies is to support the sales of the automobile industry as a whole. The 
Japanese automobile industry was hit by a drop in demand from foreign markets due to the 
appreciation of the Japanese yen and the global financial crisis of 2008.  
In this chapter, we estimate the effects of such policies on the sales of environment-
friendly vehicles while controlling for other factors that affect the sales of a vehicle, such as 
vehicle price, gasoline price and income. We examine how responsive the Japanese consumer 
is to such incentives and how much of it contributed to the observed rise in sales of 
environment-friendly vehicles. We will analyze the sales data of a variety of vehicles, including 
hybrid-electric vehicles, low-emission vehicles and conventional vehicles. We will compare 
the demand for these types of vehicles before and after the introduction of the tax incentives 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 An environment-friendly vehicle is a vehicle with low greenhouse gases emissions and is one that is 
considered friendly to the environment. The question of which vehicle is considered environment-friendly and 
which is not depends on the country and on the context. The definition in Japanese policy is based on fuel 
economy and exhaust gas. 
!-!
examining how the sales pattern may have changed. 
There is a growing number of studies that examine the impact of policy incentives on 
the sales of environment-friendly vehicles. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) studied various 
policies designed to increase the adoption rates of hybrid-electric vehicles in the United States 
across the federal, state and local government level. The types of policies they studied were tax 
waivers, income tax credits and non-tax incentives such as high occupancy lane priority. They 
found that sales tax waivers contributed to more than 10 times of the increase in hybrid-electric 
vehicle sales when compared to income tax credits. They also found that the effect of rising 
gasoline price on the increase in adoption rates of hybrid-electric vehicles was higher that tax 
incentives. Diamond (2009) studied the impact of government incentives on hybrid-electric 
vehicles in the United States, and found that there was a weak relationship between adoption 
rates and tax incentives. They also found that policies that provide direct incentives, such as 
upfront payments upon purchase of a new vehicle tend to be the most effective. Chandra et al. 
(2010) examined the impact of a tax rebate policy for hybrid-electric vehicle sales in Canadian 
provinces. They estimated that 26% of hybrid-electric vehicles sold in the period of the tax 
rebate program were due the tax rebate program itself. On the other hand, they also noted that 
the program subsidized consumers who were planning to purchase a hybrid-electric vehicle 
even if there was no subsidy. Beresteanu and Li (2011) studied hybrid-electric vehicle demand 
and the effect of the income tax credit incentives and gasoline price in the United States. The 
effect of the government incentive program was estimated as 20% of the sales of hybrid electric 
vehicles by the year 2006, while the increase of gasoline price from 1999 to 2006 attributed to 
37% increase in sales numbers of hybrid-electric vehicles. 
We can in see from the studies reviewed above that the structure of a tax incentive is a 
strong determinant in its success and that tax waivers were more effective than income tax 
credit. For our analysis, the incentives used in Japan were tax waivers and lump-sum subsidies 
!.!
to buyers. We expect to see a strong effect of these tax incentives in Japan compared to the 
mixed approach of tax incentives in countries such as the United States. 
The contribution of this analysis is twofold. First, it includes all types of environment-
friendly vehicles and not only hybrid-electric vehicles. We also include conventional vehicles. 
The nature of the tax incentives in Japan helped with that approach as it includes vehicles with 
low greenhouse gas emissions other than hybrid-electric vehicles. Second, the tax cut policy in 
Japan was more direct and easy to understand as a reduction in the taxes consumers paid upon 
purchase. The benefits or reduction in taxes were reaped quickly with no complications. In the 
case of the tax cut policies in the United States, in addition to the straightforward tax waivers, 
some other tax incentives were indirect and had an administrative cost on the part of the 
consumer. For example, an income tax credit scheme was implement as tax incentives for 
hybrid-electric vehicles. This gives income tax credits to consumers who bought hybrid-
electric vehicles which can be used to reduce the income tax that is collected. The benefits are 
not directly related to the taxes paid upon purchase, but related to other taxes that these 
consumers pay such as income taxes. This distinction is very important as to how differently 
will consumers react to the tax policies in Japan. 
We begin in section 2.2 with an overview of the Tonnage and Acquisition Tax Cuts for 
Environment-friendly Vehicles and the Eco-Car Subsidy. In section 2.3, we explain the sources 
of the data used in this chapter and why this particular dataset has been chosen, in addition to 
the explanation on the method used in the analysis. In section 2.4, we interpret the estimated 
results from the analysis and its implications. Section 2.5 is concluding remarks. 
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2.2. Incentives for Purchasing Environment-Friendly 
Vehicles 
The Tonnage and Acquisition Tax Cuts for Environment-Friendly Vehicles and the 
Eco-Car Subsidy were introduced in April 2009 in the FY2009 Tax Reform legislation,6 a 
document produced every fiscal year from the Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. The 
policy was originally proposed by the Japanese Automobile Workers’ Union7 and later passed 
by the Ministry of Finance. The tax cut was supposed to end by March 2012 but it was extended 
until April of 2015. The decision for the extension of this policy was documented in the 
FY2012 Tax Reform legislation.8 The extension was partly made because the appreciation of 
the yen had negatively affected global demand for Japanese automobiles. The program was 
extended in order to support automakers and help them make up for the loss in global markets 
with the increase of sales in the domestic market. The program was extended again after 2015 
and still is ongoing as of the writing of this paper. 
Table 2.1 explains the Tonnage and Acquisition Tax Cuts for Environment-Friendly 
Vehicles in details. Depending on the level of greenhouse gas emissions, a vehicle can be 
eligible for the program and be considered environment-friendly. There are three levels of tax 
cuts: 50%, 75% and 100%. The more fuel-efficient a vehicle is, the higher tax cut percentage 
category it will be. Hybrid-electric vehicles and electric vehicles are in the 100% tax cut 
category, which means that taxes are waived completely. For example, the Toyota Prius, a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
+!The FY2009 Tax Reform document was retrieved in PDF form from this URL: 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tax_policy/tax_reform/fy2009/tax2009a.pdf 
,!The original request (Japanese) for the policy can be found in the following URL: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/main/downloadfiles/zeisei24/youbou_165.pdf 
-The FY2012 Tax Reform document was retrieved from: 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tax_policy/tax_reform/fy2012/tax2012a.pdf 
!&&!
hybrid-electric vehicle is eligible for a 100% tax cut, while the Honda Fit, a non-hybrid 
environment-friendly vehicle,9 is eligible for a 50% tax cut. The tax cut is applied for two taxes, 
the acquisition tax and the tonnage tax. Acquisition tax is the tax paid upon the purchase of the 
vehicle, while the tonnage tax is the tax paid in the mandatory vehicle inspection which should 
be done after three years from the time of the purchase and once every two years after that.  
Table 2.2 explains the Eco-Car Subsidy. The first wave of the subsidy is implemented from 
April 2009 till September 2010. The second wave is from December 2011 till September 2012. 
The first wave of the program contains favorable treatment for the retirement of old vehicles. 
If you replaced a combustion-engine vehicle that you owned for 13 years or more with a 
environment-friendly vehicle, you receive 250,000 yen for buying passenger vehicle or 
125,000 for buying a light-motor vehicle. When you buy an environment-friendly vehicle 
without replacing it for a combustion-engine vehicle, you receive 100,000 yen for buying a 
passenger vehicle or 50,000 yen for buying a light-motor vehicle. The second wave of the 
program does not contain the favorable treatment for retirement of old vehicles and simply 
offers 100,000 for buying an environment-friendly vehicle or 70,000 for buying a light-motor 
vehicle. 
 
2.3. Data and Method 
2.3.1. Data 
Our data set contains the monthly sales numbers of the top 30 selling vehicles in Japan, 
most of which are eligible for the Tonnage and Acquisition Tax Cuts for Environment-friendly 
Vehicles and the Eco-Car Subsidy. We use the sales data as our dependent variable. Since the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
.!Later model of the Honda Fit were hybrid-electric models.!
!&'!
tax incentives were introduced in April of 2009, we chose that date as around the midpoint of 
our data and decided to use the sales data from April 2006 to March 2013. The vehicles were 
chosen on the basis of data availability, continuity of sales from April 2006 until March 2013 
and being among the top 30 selling vehicles in the market in Japan. 
Table 2.3 shows the 30 vehicles with the corresponding maximum10 tax cut percentage 
and maker information. We obtained the data for the monthly sales numbers of the vehicle, 
from April 2006 until March 2013, from a statistic released monthly for the sales of new 
passenger cars by Japan Automobile Dealers Association.11  
For our independent variables, we use vehicle price, the average price of steel, average 
price of gasoline, average income per capita and total sales of vehicles. The prices for the 
vehicles in Japan are taken from the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) which is 
posted on the website of the manufacturer.12 For older vehicle models, we used the MSRP from 
carsensor.net. The data set covers the MSRP prices for all 30 vehicles from April 2006 until 
March 2013. Steel price data were obtained from Japan Iron and Steel Recycling Institute13 
and is time variant but not vehicle variant. Average monthly prices of regular gasoline for Japan 
were obtained from the website of the Oil Information Center, Institute of Energy Economics. 
They are offered on a weekly and monthly basis for the prices of different types of gasoline 
across Japan, and for the purposes of this analysis we will use the monthly data.14 The monthly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&/!Many vehicles changed with the introduction of new models from non-eligible to eligible, and some rose to a 
higher rank of eligibility from 50% to 75%. Also, some new models of vehicles became hybrid models. 
Maximum here corresponds to the vehicles highest ranking of tax cut that it achieved during the time span of 
our sample. 
 
&&The official title of the statistics is Shinsha Jouyousha Hanbai Daisu Rankingu (New Passenger Car Sales 
Ranking), which was retrieved from the following URL: http://www.jada.or.jp/contents/data/ranking/index.php 
&'The MSRP data was obtained from the official website of the maker for each of the 10 vehicles, the data of 
past editions of the vehicle were obtained from the archived catalogues posted on the website. 
&(!http://www.jisri.or.jp/market/market_kakaku29.html!
&)The official title of the statistics is Kyuyusho Gasorin Keiyu Toyu Shujichosa (Weekly Survey on Prices of 
!&(!
average income per capita data is from Family Income and Expenditure Survey15  and is 
produced monthly by The Statistics Bureau and the Director-General for Policy Planning of 
Japan’s website. 
Table 2.4 shows a summary of the descriptive statistics information for the dataset. 
Since the tax incentives were introduced in April 2009, data before and after the 
implementation of the tax incentives were used to perform the study and be able to compare 
the difference in sales numbers with and without the tax incentives. Thus, the time period of 
data spans from April 2006 until March 2013. 
 
2.3.2. Method 
We regress the sales numbers of environment-friendly vehicles on various explanatory 
variables using the fixed effects model16. We have two approaches to estimate the effect of the 
tax cuts on the sales of vehicles. In the first approach, we create dummy variables for the 
vehicles that received tax cuts, with three dummy variables for each of the levels of tax cuts 
(100%, 75% and 50%). We use these dummy variables to determine the effect of the three 
different percentages of the tax cuts on the sales of the environment-friendly vehicles. As for 
the subsidies, since they are only time variant and not vehicle variant we use dummy variables 
to indicate the period they were implemented. The equation to be estimated is as follows: 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Gasoline, Light Oil, Kerosine). The data was retrieved from the following URL: 
http://oil-info.ieej.or.jp/price/price.html 
&*!The data was retrieved from: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index.htm!
&+!Hausman test shows fixed effects estimates to be more consistent. 
!&)!
!"#$!%&'( ) * + ,-!"./01%&'( + ,2!"3$&4!0"%( + ,5!"6"147%( +,89$:;<=>??'( + ,@9$:;<=AB'( + ,C9$:;<=B?'( + ,D#<E&0FGH"%'( +,I#<E&0FG9J4'( + ,K!"94=$!#$!%&( + ,-LM$/=NO<$P%( + #%$&4"Q<77G + R         (2.1) 
 
In equation (1), !"#$!%&'( , represents the logged sales of vehicle 0  for month 0 . !"./01%&'(, represents the logged price of vehicle 0 in month =. We control for price with this 
variable in order to isolate the effect of tax incentives from changes in price, but we run into 
the problem of endogeneity of price. We will use instrumental variable to fix this problem 
which we will discuss at the end of this section. !"3$&4!0"%(, represents the logged price of 
regular gasoline in month =. Since environment-friendly vehicles are fuel-efficient, a rise in 
gasoline price could increase its sales since consumer want to save on fuel cost. We include 
gasoline price to control for this effect. Although we have four vehicles out of the thirty that 
aren’t environment-friendly and therefore considered non-fuel-efficient, we still decided to 
include gasoline price. !"6"147%(, represents the logged per capita income in Japan for month = . This variable is included as a proxy for household budget constraint. 9$:;<=>??'( , 9$:;<=AB'( and 9$:;<=B?'(, are the dummy variables for vehicles eligible for 100%, 75% 
and 50% tax cuts respectively. For these dummy variables, when a vehicle is eligible for tax 
cuts, it takes the value of 1, otherwise, it takes the value of 0. The base for these dummy 
variables is 9$:;<=S%/4 or vehicles that are not eligible for any tax cuts. !"94=$!#$!%&( , 
represents the log of total sales of all vehicles in month =. We included this variable to control 
for any shifts in that could affect the demand for vehicles in the Japanese market as a whole. M$/=NO<$P%(, is a dummy variable indicating months = that are affected by the Great East 
Japan Earthquakes. There was a decrease in sales in these months due to the earthquake and 
this dummy variable captures that effect. These months are March and April of 2011. #%$&4"Q<77G, is a vector of dummy variables used to control for seasonality. 
!&*!
In the second approach, we create a new variable that measures how much consumers 
are saving with each purchase, in other words, a discount in monetary terms. We call it 9$:Q0&14<"=. The vehicles which are not eligible for a tax cut have a zero discount in this 
variable. Eligible vehicles in this variable take the value of the amount that was cut from the 
taxes17. We regress sales on this discount amount variable and find the estimate. The equation 
for the second approach is as follows. 
 !"#$!%&'( ) * + ,-!"./01%&'( + ,2!"3$&4!0"%( + ,5!"6"147%( +,89$:Q0&14<"='( + ,@#<E&0FGH"%'( + ,C#<E&0FG9J4'( + ,D!"94=$!#$!%&( +,IM$/=NO<$P%( + #%$&4"Q<77G + R         (2.2) 
 
The only difference between equation (2.1) and equation (2.2) is that we swapped out 9$:;<=>??'( , 9$:;<=AB'(  and 9$:;<=B?'(  with 9$:Q0&14<"='( . This new variable 
represents the value of discount in Japanese yen that consumers are gaining from buying 
vehicle 0 in month =. 
We use many independent variables to control for factors other than tax cuts in this 
study, and one of the variables is the price. We run into the problem of endogeneity here since 
price is a function of sales. This causes inconsistent estimators and to fix this problem we use 
the instrumental variable (IV) fixed effects model instead. The instrumental variable we chose 
to use is the average price of steel. Steel price affects the production cost of the vehicle and it 
term cause a supply side shift that would affect the price. In other words, we can fix the 
endogeneity problem by using steel price, which affects sales of vehicles through its effect on 
vehicle price, as an instrument for vehicle price. We specifically used the average price of the 
H shaped beam steel and not a steel that has been melded to be a part of a vehicle. We do that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to make our instrumental variable a representative of the general price of steel that is not 
affected by vehicles sales. 
 
2.4. Result and Implications 
Estimated results for the fixed effects model are shown in Table 5. We will focus on 
model 1 and model 3 of Table 5 which are the models corrected for seasonality. The 
coefficients of interest here are the tax cut dummy coefficients. The TaxCut100 coefficient is 
1.225 and is significant at the 1% level. This could be interpreted as that sales for vehicles that 
became eligible for a 100% tax cut increased by 122.5% compared to before the introduction 
of the tax cuts. This result is to be expected, as this category is the most generous and includes 
hybrid-electric vehicles which increased dramatically in sales such as the Toyota Prius. Also, 
this was the easiest tax cut to understand because it was a tax exemption. The TaxCut75 
coefficient is 0.325 and is significant at the 1% level. This has the same interpretations as above 
with a 32.5% increase in sales for vehicles eligible for the 75% tax cut compared to before the 
introduction of the tax cut. Most of the vehicles included in the study were in this category, 
43% of them to be exact. We can see that the tax exemption was more effective compared to a 
75% tax cut. This is certainly because of the 25% increase in discount of taxes. We also think 
it is because, a tax exemption is more appealing to consumers than a percentage cut. The 
TaxCut50 coefficient was insignificant. This result is odd; however, the insignificance of the 
50% tax cut could be explained within our sample as the sales of vehicles eligible for 100% 
and 75% tax cuts were replacing sales that would have otherwise gone to vehicles eligible for 
a 50% tax cut. As for the subsidies, the coefficient for SubsidyOne is 0.132 and significant at 
the 5% level. This translate to a contribution of 13.2% increase in sales due to the subsidy. 
According to our result, the subsidy was less effective than the tax cuts for our sample. For 
SubsidyTwo, the coefficient is !0.168 and significant at the 5% level. This result is 
!&,!
contradictory to the expectation as it means that the second subsidy decreased the sales instead 
of increasing them, however this result will change when we see the IV fixed effect model. The 
other coefficient of interest is gasoline price which was insignificant. The reason gasoline price 
turned out insignificant in our sample, could be due to the types of vehicles we include. We 
have both environment-friendly vehicles and conventional vehicles. An increasing gasoline 
price is expected to increase the sales of environment-friendly vehicles, because they are more 
fuel-efficient. However, a rising gasoline price is expected to decrease the sales of conventional 
vehicles because the more expensive the gasoline would increase the fuel cost of non-fuel-
efficient vehicles and therefore discourage sales. In our sample, only about 13% of the vehicles 
included are conventional vehicles, so we would expect the gasoline price coefficient to be 
positive and somewhat significant. Since in our results it was insignificant and considering that 
only 13% of our sample are conventional vehicles, there is a possibility that consumers in Japan 
are less responsive to gasoline prices compared to tax cuts when deciding to purchase an 
environment-friendly vehicle. In model 3 the coefficient of interest is TaxDiscount, its 
coefficient is 4.88e-06 and significant at the 5% level. This can be interpreted as a tax discount 
of 10,000yen increases sales by 4.88%. The SubsidyOne coefficient is 0.136 and significant at 
the 5% level (a 13.6% increase in sales). The coefficient of SubsidyTwo is X0.176 and 
significant at the 5% level (a 17.6 decrease in sales). Gasoline is insignificant in this model as 
well. 
Next, we explain the instrumental variable fixed effects model shown in Table 6. We 
will focus on the corrected for seasonality model 1 and model 3 here as well. In model 1 
TaxCut100 is 1.433 and significant at the 1% level. This means an increase of 143.3% due to 
the tax cut. TaxCut75 is 0.548 and significant at the 1% level. Which means an increase of 
54.8% due to the tax cut. TaxCut50 is 0.382 and significant at the 1% level. Which translates 
to a 38.2% increase. We notice that in the IV fixed effects model, TaxCut50 is significant which 
!&-!
makes more sense. We can see stronger results for the tax cuts in the IV fixed effect model 
compared to the base fixed effect model and the effect of the tax cut is stronger the higher the 
tax cut percentage is. The gasoline price coefficients are insignificant in this model which 
reconfirms the results we obtained from the fixed effect model. The SubsidyOne coefficient is 
0.283 and is significant at the 1% level. This means that sales vehicles eligible for the first 
subsidy wave increased by 28.3% compared to before the subsidy. The SubsidyTwo 
coefficients are insignificant in this model. We can see from this result that the second subsidy 
wave was less effective compared to the first subsidy wave. This results also makes more sense 
than the base fixed effect model where we saw negative results for the second subsidy wave. 
In Model 3 TaxDiscount is 6.25e-06 and is significant at the 1% level. This means that for a 
10,000yen discount sales increased by 6.25%. SubsidyOne is 0.236 and is significant at the 1% 
level (a 23.6% increase in sales due to the subsidy). SubsidyTwo and Gasoline are insignificant 
in this model. We think that by controlling for the endogeneity of price problem, we were able 
to obtain better results that are more in line with our theoretical expectations. 
Tax incentives played the most important role in increasing the sales of environment-
friendly vehicles in all regression models. Gasoline prices were expected to be related 
positively to sales since fuel-efficient vehicles benefit consumers by saving more when 
gasoline prices are high and most of our sample is of fuel-efficient vehicles, but the results 
came insignificant in all models. This result could be due to the 4 conventional vehicle models 
in our sample that are expected to have an opposite relationship with gasoline price compared 
to fuel-efficient vehicles. The effect of the first wave of the subsidy was significant and 
positive, but the effect of the second wave was not. This leads us to believe that tax cuts are 
more effective than subsidies for the Japanese automobile market. 
 
 
!&.!
2.5. Conclusion 
This study estimated the impact of the Tonnage and Acquisition Tax Cut for 
Environment-Friendly Vehicles and the Eco-Car Subsidy, on the sales of environment-friendly 
vehicles in the Japanese automobile market. We used the sales data of the 30 top selling 
vehicles in the market from the period before and after the implementation of the tax incentives 
and measured their effect. Tax incentives in Japan had a larger role in the increase of the sales 
numbers of the environment-friendly vehicles, while gasoline prices had almost no impact 
compared to it, although we tested the impact of gasoline for the whole market and not just 
specifically for environment-friendly vehicles. One reason why the effect of tax incentives in 
Japan was strong is that the tax incentives in Japan are immediate and easy to understand. They 
fall in three categories, a complete tax exemption, a percentage cut of the tax to be paid and a 
lump-sum subsidy. The United States has a more complicated and non-unified approach for 
environment-friendly vehicles. It was a mix of tax waivers, which are similar to the tax cuts in 
Japan; income tax credits; and other non-monetary incentives. This approach is more 
complicated mainly because income tax credit had two barriers, the delay in gratification of 
cashing-in on the discount that the consumers obtained, which was reaped when they filed their 
taxes at the end of the year, and the administrative cost of the paperwork that needs to be done 
in order to obtain the income tax credit. 
The result of this study has several implications for the environment-friendly vehicles 
market in Japan. First, consumers reacted substantially to tax cuts on automobile purchases 
when the tax cuts were direct and paid upon purchase. The effect of subsidies was significant 
but not as large as tax cuts. With the strong effect of tax incentives, environment-friendly 
vehicles are becoming more popular and we see a trend of these vehicles being the norm in the 
market with how consistently they top the sales charts each month, especially hybrid-electric 
vehicles. With the continuation of the tax incentives, environment-friendly vehicles have the 
!'/!
potential to eclipse conventional vehicles in Japan and that will certainly aid in reducing the 
CO2 emission from the Japanese automobile market. 
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Tables and Figures 
!
Table 2.1: Tonnage and Acquisition Tax Cut for Environment-Friendly Vehicles 
!
! Hybrid 
Electric 
Vehicle 
Low-Emission Passenger 
Vehicles 
Low-Emission Heavy-Duty 
Vehicles 
! ! Exhaust gas 
down  by 75% 
from 2005 
standards 
Exhaust gas 
down  by 75% 
from 2005 
standards 
Exhaust gas 
down  by 75% 
from 2005 
standards 
Exhaust gas 
down  by 75% 
from 2005 
standards 
Fuel Efficiency 
25% above 
2010 standards 
Fuel Efficiency 
15% above 
2010 standards 
Fuel Efficiency 
25% above 
2010 standards 
Fuel 
Efficiency 
15% above 
2010 standards 
Tonnage Tax cut 100% 75% 50% 75% 50% 
Acquisition Tax cut 100% 75% 50% 75% 50% 
!
Note: The effective period of tonnage tax cut is from 1 April 2009 to 30 April 2012 and that of acquisition tax cut 
is from 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2012. After March 2012, the fuel efficiency standards are revised to that of 
2015. 
 
Source: Japanese Automotive Dealers Association 
http://jama-english.jp/asia/news/2009/vol36/index.html 
!
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Table 2.2: First and Second Waves of Eco-Car Subsidy 
!
! First Subsidy Wave Second Subsidy Wave 
Period Apr 2009 until Sept 2010 Dec 2011 until Sept 2012 
Conditions Replace a combustion 
engine vehicle used for 
over 13 years with an 
Eco-Friendly Vehicle 
Buy an Eco-Friendly 
Vehicle 
Buy an Eco-Friendly Vehicle 
Subsidy amount Passenger car: 
250,000 yen 
 
Light-motor car: 
125,000 yen 
Passenger car: 
100,000 yen 
 
Light-motor car: 
50,000 yen 
Passenger car: 
100,000 yen 
 
Light-motor car: 
70,000 yen 
Budget 580,000 million 270,000 million 
!
!
Source: http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/2012/1222nk/pdf/12-1-3.pdf [In Japanese] 
 
!
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!
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Table 2.3: Levels of Tax Cut 
!
Maker Model Maximum Tax Cut 
Toyota Corolla 75% 
Toyota Vits 50% 
Honda Fit 50% 
Toyota Estima 50% 
Nissan Selena 75% 
Honda Step Wagon  75% 
Toyota Wish 75% 
Toyota Ractis 75% 
Toyota Passo 50% 
Toyota Crown 50% 
Nissan Note 100% 
Nissan Tiida 0% 
Toyota Alphard 75% 
Toyota Voxy 75% 
Toyota bB 0% 
Mazda Demio 100% 
Nissan Cube 75% 
Toyota Noah 75% 
Suzuki Swift 0% 
Subaru Legacy 50% 
Toyota Prius 100% 
Toyota Markx 0% 
Toyota Isis 75% 
Honda Odyssey  75% 
Honda Stream 50% 
Toyota Porte 50% 
Toyota Sienta 50% 
Honda Freed 75% 
Nissan Wingroad 50% 
Toyota Premio 75% 
!
!
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics!
!
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Sales (units) 4877.475                  4476.563 3 45496 2520 
Price (yen) 2115319             1057417 409500 6103650 2520 
Income (yen) 522316.2         146141.9 413506 968846 84 
Gasoline 
(yen/lier) 
145.226                 13.781 117 196 84 
Tax Cut 100% 0.0266                0.161 0 1 2520 
Tax Cut 75% 0.103  0.304 0 1 2520 
Tax Cut 50% 0.179    0.383 0 1 2520 
Tax Discount 
(yen) 
16043.36              29048.03 0 140450 2520 
Subsidy One 0.202    0.402 0 1 84 
Subsidy Two 0.119 0.324 0 1 84 
Total Sales 
(units) 
266224.5 69960.35 108824 497959 84 
Earthquake ! ! 0 1 84 
Steel Price 
(yen/ton) 
81078.57 15655.17 63700 129350 2520 
!
!
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Table 2.5: Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Const -29.974*** (8.923) 
!14.189*** 
(2.500) 
!31.036*** 
(7.637) 
 !13.608*** 
(2.554) 
lnPrice 0.672***    (0.165) 
0.686***    
(0.172) 
0.633***     
(0.173) 
0.658***   
(0.177) 
lnGasoline !0.094    (0.146) 
!0.072    
(0.114) 
!0.106    
(0.148) 
!0.080    
(0.115) 
lnIncome 1.027*   (0.530) 
!0.070**    
(0.025) 
1.171**    
(0.480) 
!0.074*** 
(0.025) 
TaxCut100% 1.225***    (0.335)  
1.200***     
(0.329) - - 
TaxCut75% 0.325***    (0.113) 
0.296**    
(0.110) - - 
TaxCut50% 0.100    (0.113) 
0.073    
(0.109) - - 
TaxDiscount - - 4.88e-06 ** (2.28e-06) 
4.45e-06* 
(2.27e-06) 
SubsidyOne 0.132**    (0.052) 
0.137***    
(0.047) 
0.136**    
(0.053) 
0.143***    
(0.047) 
SubsidyTwo  !0.168** (0.070) 
 !0.143** 
(0.062) 
!0.176**    
(0.070) 
!0.154**    
(0.062) 
lnTotalSales 1.243***   (0.141) 
1.095***    
(0.047) 
1.228**    
(0.134) 
1.087***    
(0.048) 
Earthquake !0.030    (0.156) 
-0.095 
(0.183) 
!0.052     
(0.157) 
!0.112   
(0.181) 
Seasonality Yes No Yes No 
Number of Obs 2520 2520 2520 2520 
R-squared 0.156 0.15 0.116 0.108 
 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10% level 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Table 2.6: IV Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Const -28.95*** (-13.08) 
-28.89*** 
(-12.17) 
-23.77*** 
(-13.67) 
-23.78*** 
(-13.10) 
lnPrice 1.715*** (12.77) 
1.701*** 
(11.54) 
1.365*** 
(14.01) 
1.358*** 
(12.88) 
lnGasoline 0.202 (1.63) 
0.187 
(1.55) 
0.168 
(1.40) 
0.158 
(1.36) 
lnIncome -0.147** (-3.04) 
-0.136** 
(-3.05) 
-0.134** 
(-2.87) 
-0.125** 
(-2.91) 
TaxCut100% 1.433*** (16.40) 
1.429*** 
(16.18) - - 
TaxCut75% 0.548*** (10.90) 
0.543*** 
(10.27) - - 
TaxCut50% 0.382*** (7.79) 
0.376*** 
(7.12) - - 
TaxDiscount - - 6.25e-06*** (13.30) 
6.22e-06*** 
(12.81) 
SubsidyOne 0.283*** (8.86) 
0.278*** 
(8.46) 
0.236*** 
(8.27) 
0.234*** 
(8.12) 
SubsidyTwo 0.0451 (1.08) 
0.0405 
(0.93) 
0.0314 
(0.77) 
0.0280 
(0.66) 
lnTotalSales 1.054*** (20.69) 
1.059*** 
(23.24) 
1.048*** 
(21.22) 
1.052*** 
(23.72) 
Earthquake 0.0660 (0.82) 
0.0674 
(0.86) 
0.0273 
(0.35) 
0.0286 
(0.38) 
Seasonality Yes No Yes No 
Number of Obs 2520 2520 2520 2520 
R-squared 0.357 0.358 0.3418 0.342 
 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10% level 
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Figure 2.1: Change in Sales After Tax Incentives 
 
 
 
April-09: Tax incentives and first wave of subsidy were implemented 
Dec-11: Second wave of subsidy was implemented 
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3. Charging Infrastructure, Range Anxiety, and Sales of 
Electric Vehicles 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 Electric vehicles are expected to reduce carbon dioxides emissions by replacing 
conventional vehicles, hybrid-electric vehicles and other types of vehicles. Nevertheless, in 
many countries, the consumer demand for electric vehicles is still low, even in countries with 
tax exemptions for electric vehicles. While over 665,000 passenger car electric vehicles were 
sold worldwide through 2014, they represent only 0.08% of total passenger car stock (Electric 
Vehicle Initiative, 2015).  
Setting aside the high price of electric vehicles, one of the major obstacles to increasing 
sales might be consumer anxiety about new technology. Running out of battery is a prominent 
example of such anxiety that consumers might feel about electric vehicles. The range of the 
distance that could be driven by an electric vehicle with a fully charged battery is significantly 
less than the range of a conventional vehicle with a full tank of gasoline18. One solution to that 
problem that might help alleviate the driving range anxiety, is the construction of electricity 
charging stations. With enough charging stations in proximity, where consumers can charge 
their electric vehicles, the short driving range problem can be negated. However, charging 
stations are not cheap to build and firms are not willing to build charging stations if there was 
no demand for them to begin with. Therefore, government intervention is needed to fix this 
problem. One way to do so is to subsidize the construction of charging stations and driving the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&-A fully charged Nissan Leaf can drive 228km, while a fully tanked Toyota Prius can drive 1,280km. 
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demand of electric vehicles by increasing the availability of said charging stations. 
  In 2009, the Japanese government also implemented another policy that is aimed to 
stimulate the sales of electric vehicles by increasing the charging infrastructure. Under the 
Subsidy Program for Clean Energy Vehicle, the Japanese government provides half of the cost 
for constructing charging stations of electric vehicles from the fiscal year 2009 to 2012. Since 
the fiscal year 2013, the program has been expanded to cover a maximum rate of two thirds of 
the total cost. There are two types of charging stations that were subsidies, fast charging stations 
and regular charging stations. We will refer to regular charging stations as slow charging 
stations in this chapter19. As their name suggests, fast charging stations charge electric vehicles 
faster. Since then, Japan has installed the highest number of fast charging station in the world 
while it has placed less emphasis on slow charging stations (Electric Vehicle Initative, 2013). 
While it seems obvious that charging infrastructure is an important driver for electric vehicle 
demand, it is still unclear how much demand is stimulated by additional investment in charging 
infrastructure. Even though the investment in charging infrastructure seems to mitigate the 
range anxiety, people might charge their electric vehicles at home in most cases. If this is true, 
then additional investment might not dramatically change the demand for electric vehicles. 
Consumers might be just content with charging their electric vehicles at home. The effect of 
range anxiety is also difficult to capture. Although we can expect that the range anxiety is 
higher for drivers who drive for longer periods, their demand for electric vehicles might be 
higher than others because of potential fuel cost saving of driving an electric vehicle.20  
Many previous studies have analyzed the demand for electric vehicles using stated 
choice approach (Beggs and Cardell, 1980; Beggs et al., 1981; Ewing and Sarigöllü, 1998; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&.!A Nissan Leaf can be charged in about 40 minutes by a fast charging station and between 8 to 16 hours in a 
slow charging station. https://www3.nissan.co.jp/vehicles/new/leaf/charge.html (Japanese) 
20 Using the average price of 1 liter of gasoline and the average price of 1 kwh of electricity from our data, we 
calculated that a Nissan leaf approximately runs on average 0.29 km/yen and a Toyota Prius runs on average 
0.27 km/yen. It is important to keep in mind that the Prius leads the industry in fuel efficiency yet for Japan an 
electric vehicle is cheaper to run. 
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Bunch et al., 1993; Golob et al., 1997; Brownstone et al., 2000; Hidrue et al., 2011; Achtnicht, 
2012; Daziano, 2013; Axsen et al., 2013; Ito et al., 2013). These studies ask respondents, by 
using hypothetical survey questionnaire, to choose most preferable alternative from the set of 
profiles that have different levels of car attributes, such as price, engine power, fuel economy, 
and driving range. From the estimated coefficients of these attributes, one can calculate the 
marginal willingness to pay for improving particular attributes of an electric vehicle. Several 
studies among stated choice studies include the availability of charging infrastructure as the 
attribute of choice profile (Bunch et al., 1993; Brownstone et al., 2000; Achtnicht, 2012; Ito et 
al. 2013).  These studies generally find that higher availability of charging stations increase 
choice probability of electric vehicles. For example, Ito et al. (2013) distinguished the slow 
charging station and fast charging station, and found that the willingness to pay for the latter is 
higher than that for the former. Some studies focus on range anxiety. Daziano (2013) 
summarizes that the mean estimated willingness to pay for a one-mile improvement of driving 
range in the past studies in US is 100 dollars per mile. Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) uses meta-
analysis and reports that mean willingness to pay are between 66 and 75 US dollars for a one-
mile increase in driving range. 
While the results of these stated preference studies suggest that infrastructure 
investment and reducing range anxiety is an important driver for the diffusion of electric 
vehicles, most studies do not use actual sales data. One exception is a study by Sierzchula et 
al. (2014) that investigated electric vehicles’ shares in 30 countries for the year 2012. They 
found that financial incentives, charging infrastructure, and local presence of production 
facilities are positively correlated with electric vehicle adoption rates in a statistically 
significant way. While their country level data can investigate a certain range of policy and 
economic characteristics, the small number of cross-section sample is too crude to efficiently 
capture the impact of various determinants on demand. 
!((!
This study contributes to existing literatures in the following manner. First, it develops 
a simple theoretical model of willingness to pay for electric vehicles. We incorporate the effect 
of charging infrastructure and range anxiety into the model and discuss how they are related to 
the demand. Second, it empirically examines the effect of charging infrastructure and range 
anxiety on sales of electric vehicles. We investigate the demand for the Nissan Leaf, by using 
actual sales data in 47 Japanese prefectures in 2011 and 2012. Third, it investigates how 
additional infrastructure investment reduces carbon dioxide emissions. We discuss the cost 
efficiency of the subsidy policy and the possibility that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant accident lowered the abatement rates from driving electric vehicles since electricity 
production shifted from nuclear power to other sources that emits CO2.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2, formulates a theoretical 
model as underpinnings for our empirical analysis. Section 3.3, explains the empirical 
methodology and data. Section 3.4, discusses the results and its implication. Section 3.5, 
discusses the impact of additional infrastructure on the reduction of carbon dioxide emission 
and its cost effectiveness. In section 3.6, we present concluding remarks. 
 
3.2. Theoretical Model 
We define a linear indirect utility for buying an electric vehicle (TY) and for buying a 
conventional vehicle (TZ): 
 TY ) ,Y + ,[ \ X ]Y X Y^ _ ! X G !` O , 
 TZ ) ,Z + ,[ \ X ]Z X Z^ _ ! X a _ ! , 
 
!()!
WhereU\ is exogenously given income, ] is the upfront cost of the vehicle, ^ is the fuel 
cost per distance unit, !  is the driving distance that is assumed as exogenously given and 
depends on which region the consumer lives in. G  is the anxiety cost from driving range 
measured in monetary terms, O  is the number of charging stations in the region, a  is the 
subjective external cost on environment per distance unit. ,Y  and ,Z  are constant terms of 
utility functions that represent composite benefit from choosing a specific car model, ,[ is the 
marginal utility of income.  For simplicity, we do not consider the future fuel cost or future 
external cost. We assume bcbd e ?, that is, anxiety from electric vehicles driving range decreases 
when the number of charging stations in the region increases. We also assume bcbf g ?, anxiety 
from driving range of electric vehicle is lower in regions where consumers drive longer 
distances. Subjective external cost on the environment a is assumed to be zero for consumers 
that do not care about the environment. 
Assuming a linear indirect utility, the additional willingness to pay for an electric 
vehicle compared to a conventional vehicle can be calculated by taking the difference of the 
two indirect utility functions: 
 h9. ) TY X TZ ) , + ,[ i] + i^ _ ! X G !` O + a _ !  
 
Where , ) ,Y X ,Z , i] ) ]1 X ]%, and i^ ) ^1 X ^%. We can investigate how the 
number of charging stations and the driving distance affect the willingness to pay for electric 
vehicles. We omit ,[ and differentiate h9. by O and !: 
 jh9.jO ) XjGjOUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUklm>n 
 
!(*!
jh9.j! ) i^ X jGj! + aUUUUUUUUUUUUklmon 
 
The sign of equation (3.1) is positive because we assumed that bcbd e ?. Additional 
charging stations will decrease the range anxiety; therefore, the willingness to pay for electric 
vehicles will increase. On the other hand, the sign of equation (3.2) can be positive or negative, 
depending on whether the fuel cost reduction i^  and environmental awareness effect, 
represented by external cost on environment a, is larger than the range anxiety effect. We will 
empirically examine in the next section whether the overall effect is positive or negative. 
 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
This study uses the sales numbers for the Nissan Leaf in Japan across 47 prefectures 
for 2 years (2011 and 2012). The sales data is obtained from the Japan Automobile Dealers 
Association. We regress the sales data on the number of fast charging stations that received the 
subsidy (FastCharge) in one estimation, then the number of slow charging stations that received 
the subsidy (SlowCharge) in another estimation. Finally, we combine both fast charging 
stations and slow charging station into one variable (Fast+Slow) and use it as an explanatory 
variable in the last model. The other explanatory variables we use in this estimation are, 
gasoline prices (GasPrice), electricity prices (ElecPrice), income per capita (Income), 
population (Population), the number of groups registered to Kids Eco-Club (EcoClub), average 
driving distance per vehicle in each region (DrivingDistance).  Explanatory variables are 
prefectural level, except DrivingDistance, which is regional level. The number of charging 
stations is retrieved from Next Generation Vehicle Promotion Center. Gasoline prices are 
retrieved from the Oil Information Center of the Japanese Institute for Energy Economics and 
is the average price of regular gasoline in each prefecture. Electricity prices, income per capita 
!(+!
and population are retrieved from Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. Since electricity price only changes depending on the electricity company, 
we have less variation here since there is one electricity company per region. Therefore, the 
electricity price variable is regional instead of prefectural. The number of groups that are 
registered to Kids Eco-Club is retrieved from the program's website.21 Kids Eco-Club is a 
supporting program by the Ministry of Environment for local group activity of children and 
the youth on environmental protection. The group can obtain various forms of support from 
the program for free. It is required to include at least one adult as a supporter for the group to 
register in the program. We use this variable as a proxy for environmental awareness of each 
prefecture. Average driving distance per vehicle in each region is based on the Survey on Motor 
Vehicle Fuel Consumption by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and the 
vehicle ownership data by the Automobile Inspection and Registration Information 
Association. The data is calculated by dividing the total distance of driving by gasoline using 
vehicles in each region of Japan by the total number of vehicle in each region.22 Table 3.1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics. 
Since the data is available only for two years, we use pooled OLS in this study. We log 
all the variables except for the dummy variables in order to interpret the estimated coefficients 
as elasticities. The estimated models are represented as follows:  !"M!%1=/01T%N01!%#$!%&') * + ,-!";N$/p0"p#=$=04"& + ,2!"3$&4!0"%./01%+ ,5!"M!%1=/010=G./01% + ,8!"6"147% + ,@!".4]<!$=04"+ ,C!"M14;!<E& + ,D!"Q/0q0"pQ0&=$"1% + ,Ir%$/Q<77G+ RUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUklmln!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'& http://www.j-ecoclub.jp/ 
''Japan can be divided into ten regions and transportation administration is based on the division.!
!(,!
 
Here the term ,-!";N$/p0"p#=$=04"&, will vary depending on what charging stations 
variable we use. There are three variations, ,-!"s$&=;N$/p% , ,-!"#!4J;N$/p%  and ,-tuUks$&= + #!4Jn. In other words, we estimate this model three times with three different 
groups of charging stations. The second model includes the area dummy and omits the 
electricity price variable: 
 !"M!%1=/01T%N01!%#$!%&') * + ,-!";N$/p0"p#=$=04"& + ,2!"3$&4!0"%./01%U + ,5!"6"147%+ ,8!".4]<!$=04" + ,@!"v14;!<E& + ,C!"Q/0q0"pQ0&=$"1%+ ,Dr%$/Q<77G + ,IW%p04"Q<77G + RUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUklmwn!
 
Because of the high correlation observed between electricity prices and region 
dummies, we omit electricity price in the second specification. The correlation between 
electricity prices and the region dummies come from the fact that electricity prices are constant 
for prefectures within the same region, and varies only between regions, therefore when we 
create region dummies, electricity prices highly correlates with it. 
 
3.4. Results  
The results are shown in Table 3.2. Model 1 and 2 combines the number of fast charging 
stations with slow charging stations in a variable named Fast+Slow. Models 3 and 4 includes 
only fast charging stations, while models 5 and 6 includes only slow charging stations. Since 
there is a significant difference in charging speeds between these two types of infrastructure, 
we can expect that impact of investing in fast charging stations is stronger than that of investing 
in slow charging stations. The other difference in the models is that models 2, 4 and 6 include 
!(-!
region dummies and exclude electricity prices due to high correlation between it and the region 
dummies. 
All of the coefficients on charging stations were positive and significant as expected. 
When we combine the number of fast charging station and slow charging station, the estimated 
coefficients are 0.422 and 0.447 in models 1 and 2, respectively. It suggests that a 10% increase 
in the number of charging stations is associated with increases of electric vehicle sales by 4.2% 
and 4.5%. In models 3 and 4, we see the effect of fast charging stations. The coefficients were 
0.323 and 0.333 respectively. This suggests that a 10% increase in the number of fast charging 
stations increases the sales of electric vehicles by 3.2% and 3.3% for models 3 and 4 
respectively. In models 5 and 6, we find that the coefficients for slow charging stations are 
0.230 and 0.276, respectively. Thus, the results suggest that a 10% increase in slow charging 
stations associates with an increase in sales of electric vehicles by 2.3% and 2.8% for models 
5 and 6 respectively. These results show that the impact of fast charging stations is stronger 
than the slow charging station. Moreover, we can see that overall effect of constructing 
charging stations is positive and having more charging stations will increase the sales number 
of electric vehicles. 
The signs of the coefficient for gasoline price variables were positive as expected. Since 
an increase in gasoline price encourages consumers to buy a vehicle that does not need gasoline 
to run, this is a plausible result. Gasoline price was statistically insignificant in models that 
include regional dummies and significant otherwise. The significant coefficients for gasoline 
price were 3.587, 3.924 and 3.727 in models 1, 3 and 5 respectively. We can interpret this as a 
10% increase in gasoline prices increases sales of electric vehicles by 4%. 
Electricity prices were negative and significant in all models. This is expected since 
electricity is powering electric vehicles and an increase in price would discourage sales. The 
coefficients are !1.659, !1.900 and !1.237 for models 1, 3 and 5 respectively. These results 
!(.!
suggest that the impact of electricity price on sales of electric vehicles might be lower than the 
impact of gasoline price. Many of the current charging station in shopping mall and public 
spaces provide the charging services for free, therefore the impact of electricity price might be 
mitigated by this reason. 
The coefficient of average driving distance was negative and statistically significant 
except for models 4 and 5. These results suggest that when average driving distance increase 
by 1%, sales of electric vehicles decrease by 0.9%, 1.52%, 0.99% and 1.56% for models 1, 2, 
3 and 6 respectively. If this term can be interpreted as a result of the range anxiety effect, fuel 
cost efficiency effect and environmental awareness effect, then the range anxiety effect would 
be stronger than other two effects according to this result: longer average distance discourages 
sales of electric vehicles. 
Lastly, Eco-Clubs is a variable added to measure the effect of environmentalism on the 
decision to buy an electric vehicle. The coefficients were statistically insignificant in all models 
that we examined. We cannot make any strong statement on the effect of environmental 
awareness on electric vehicle sales from the Eco-Clubs coefficients. 
 
3.5. Effect on Abatement 
In this section, we use the estimated results to infer the effect of the subsidy policy on 
the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions. The Japanese government covers half of the cost 
of building one charging station, which amounts to approximately an average of 3.75 million 
yen. Let us assume that, by increasing the number of charging stations that receives a subsidy 
by 10%, sales of electric vehicles will increase by 4.5%, which is obtained from our estimated 
coefficient on the combined variable of charging stations of model 2. Let us also assume that 
this increase is replacing either hybrid-electric vehicles or conventional vehicles. In other 
words, the number of total vehicle is unchanged and only the composition of the types vehicles 
!)/!
changes. We use the Honda Fit as a reference model to figure out how much abatement could 
be gained from a replacement of it by a Nissan Leaf. Since the Honda Fit has a conventional 
model and a hybrid-electric vehicle model, it is useful for the purpose of comparisons. Figure 
3.1 shows the estimated results on the abatement of carbon dioxide in ten regions in Japan. 
When an electric vehicle replaces a hybrid-electric vehicle (HV), a 10% increase in charging 
stations can result in an abatement of 128.843 t-CO2/Year at the highest (Kanto region) and 
2.729 t-CO2/Year, at the lowest (Okinawa region). When we assume that an electric vehicle 
replaces a conventional vehicle (CV), a 10% increase in charging stations results in an 
abatement of 258.117 t-CO2/Year at the highest (Kanto region) and 5.760 t-CO2/Year at the 
lowest (Okinawa region).  
Figure 3.2 shows the abatement levels we obtained in figure 3.1 as a share of the total 
emissions from the household sector in each region. These figures show that while abatement 
levels may be high for a certain region, that does not necessarily mean that the share is a large 
percentage of average household emissions of that same region. For example, Kanto region has 
the largest amount of CO2 abatements in Figure 1.3, but it has the lowest share of abatement 
when divided by household emissions. On the other hand, total abatement levels in the Kyushu 
region is lower than Kanto, but it achieves a comparatively higher share of abatement at around 
0.65%. Results suggest that Kyushu have the highest potential of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions from increasing charging infrastructure, while Kanto have the lowest potential. 
We can calculate the cost effectiveness of the subsidy program for charging stations by 
dividing abatements from increasing the charging infrastructure by total expenditure for the 
subsidy. The result is summarized in Table 3.3 for the ten regions in Japan. The highest cost-
effectiveness for the case of electric vehicles replacing conventional vehicles was for Kyushu 
at 8.783 million yen/t-CO2. This is significantly worse when compared to the estimated cost of 
reducing CO2 by representative measures, which ranges from 4,600 yen/t-CO2 to 11,700 yen/t-
!)&!
CO2 (Oka et al 2005). Under our current assumptions, subsidizing charging infrastructure 
might be a relatively expensive way to mitigate climate change and it might be better to invest 
in other means of abatements before resorting to subsidizing charging stations. 
One limitation of our calculation is that it relies on the stock number of electric vehicles 
existing in the market to measure the cost-effectiveness. This number is very low for the data 
sample we are using, the abatement cost in our analysis could become closer to the cost of the 
other measures to reduce CO2 if the stock number of electric vehicles increases. 
One might claim that the cost-effectiveness is negatively affected after the disaster of 
the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. This is based on the fact that most nuclear power plant 
has been stopped for the safety concern and the electricity is provided by means that are not 
emission free in substitution. While it is true that cost-effectiveness is negatively affected, it 
does not change significantly from before the disaster. This is represented in Table 3.4 that 
shows the difference of abatement levels before and after the disaster. The largest difference is 
in the Chubu region where the abatement potential is reduced by 1.72% due to the Fukushima 
Disaster. The slight change in abatement potential is due to the marginal change in electricity 
generation CO2 emissions before and the after the disaster. As shown in Figure 3.3, there is no 
dramatic change in electricity generation CO2 emissions between the years 2010, 2011 and 
2012 for each electric power company.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
We have investigated the factors that affect electric vehicle sales in Japan and found 
that higher number of charging stations is associated with an increase of electric vehicle sales. 
We have also found that areas where consumers have a higher average driving distance have 
lower electric vehicle sales. This suggests that the range anxiety effect is stronger than the fuel 
cost saving effect. We also examined how much abatement of CO2 would be gained with an 
!)'!
increase in the current stock of electric vehicles due to a hypothetical 10% increase in the 
number of charging stations using our estimate coefficients. We calculated the cost 
effectiveness of the abatement that would be gained from the 10% increase in charging 
infrastructure. We used half the average cost of building a charging station as the expenditure 
the government needs to pay as subsidy. The cost of abatement for this subsidy is considerably 
more expensive compared to the estimated cost of representative measures of reducing CO2 
(Oka et al 2005). 
Lastly, contrary to expectations, the effect of the Fukushima Nuclear Plant disaster on 
abatements forgone due to the switch from nuclear energy to other sources which increased 
carbon dioxide emissions was not as dramatic as expected. Electric power companies were 
fairly good at keeping their emissions low even after the disaster, since the change in CO2 
emission coefficient did not change significantly.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics!
!
!
!
!
!
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Obs 
Electric vehicle 
Sales (units) 227.926 248.021 35 1424 94 
Slow Charger 
(units) 52.46809  59.12711 4 335 94 
Fast Charger 
(units) 27.67 21.292 4 121 94 
Gas Price 
(yen/liter) 313.66 167.637 142.7 504.1 94 
Electricity Price 
(yen/kWh) 17.825 1.301 16.1 21.86 94 
Income (yen) 419,655.3 49,506.93 289,916 531,325 94 
Population 
(person) 2,714,043 2,678,479 580,000 13,200,000 94 
Total Sales (units) 64,672.38 61,455.71 11,825 298,522 94 
Eco Clubs (units) 60.44681 52.73521 3 264 94 
Driving Distance 
(thousands KM) 149.461 16.488 124.354 170.931 94 
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Table 3.2: Estimated Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Sales numbers of EVs 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Cons !19.814 
(12.716)  
!20.503 
(14.510) 
!21.156 
(12.936)  
!23.455 
(15.287) 
!24.387* 
(13.204)  
!24.525* 
(14.677) 
Fast + Slow 0.422***  
(0.101)  
0.447*** 
(0.113)  
- - - - 
Fast - - 0.323*** 
(0.087) 
0.333** 
(0.131) 
- - 
Slow - - - - 0.230*** 
(0.077) 
0.276*** 
(0.079) 
Gasoline Price 3.587* 
(1.801) 
2.818 
(2.073)  
3.924*** 
(1.836) 
3.067 
(2.190)  
3.727* 
(1.883) 
3.429 
(2.099)  
Electricity 
Price 
!1.659*** 
(0.526) 
- !1.900*** 
(0.553) 
- !1.237** 
(0.541) 
- 
Average 
Income 
0.139 
(0.284)  
0.558* 
(0.311) 
0.079 
(0.290)  
0.455 
(0.326)  
0.184 
(0.297)  
0.555* 
(0.317) 
Population 0.594*** 
(0.094) 
0.485*** 
(0.110) 
0.721*** 
(0.077) 
0.639*** 
(0.104) 
0.703*** 
(0.091) 
0.579*** 
(0.099) 
Eco-Clubs !0.003 
(0.057)  
!0.008 
(0.057)  
!0.013 
(0.059)  
!0.001 
(0.060)  
0.0478 
(0.057)  
0.015 
(0.058)  
Average 
Distance 
!0.904** 
(0.410) 
!1.515* 
(0.899) 
!0.985** 
(0.423) 
!1.324 
(0.950) 
!0.705 
(0.424)  
!1.555* 
(0.916) 
Year Dummy Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Area Dummy No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.852 0.878 0.846 0.864 0.838 0.873 
Significance level 
*** = 1%, ** = 5%, * =10% 
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 Table 3.3: Cost Effectiveness (million Yen/t-CO2)!
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Region 
Cost effectiveness 
vs HV  
Cost effectiveness 
vs CV  
Hokkaido! 18.666 9.297 
Tohoku! 21.777 10.776 
Kanto! 24.585 12.272 
Hokuriku! 18.454 9.160 
Chubu! 36.273 17.769 
Kinki! 23.802 11.898 
Chugoku! 31.553 15.430 
Shikoku! 36.796 18.257 
Kyushu! 17.707 8.783 
Okinawa 35.724 16.928 
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Table 3.4: The Effect of the Fukushima Disaster (t-CO2)!
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Region 
Abatement vs 
CV (Before) 
Abatement vs 
CV (After) Difference  
Hokkaido 28.588 28.435 -0.54% 
Tohoku 75.605 74.990 -0.81% 
Kanto 260.241 258.117 -0.82% 
Hokuriku 54.472 53.672 -1.47% 
Chubu 102.578 100.814 -1.72% 
Kinki 128.184 126.163 -1.58% 
Chugoku 50.607 50.453 -0.30% 
Shikoku 16.108 15.919 -1.17% 
Kyushu 142.962 140.690 -1.59% 
Okinawa 5.760 5.760 0.00% 
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Figure 3.1: Level of Abatement of Carbon Dioxides (t-CO2) 
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Figure 3.2: Share of Abatement of Carbon Dioxides (%) 
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Figure 3.3: Electricity Generation CO2 Emissions (CO2/kWh) 
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4.Fuel Efficiency Gap: Evidence from Japan 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Fuel efficiency is an important factor for consumers who are deciding which vehicle to 
purchase, particularly for those who care about operation cost. The fuel efficiency number 
described in the catalogue of the vehicle will play a significant role in purchasing decisions, 
drivers seldom achieve fuel efficiencies close to the ones advertised in the catalogue when they 
drive the vehicle on the road. This difference is to be expected for several reasons such as the 
driving behavior, road condition, etc. But when this difference between on-road (real) fuel 
efficiency and advertised (catalogue) fuel efficiency is consistently getting larger with time, 
there is the possibility that something other than driving behavior and road conditions that are 
making catalogue fuel efficiency increase year by year, while real fuel efficiency 
comparatively shows less of an increase. We will call this discrepancy between catalogue fuel 
efficiency and real fuel efficiency, the fuel efficiency gap. 
According to research done by T&E (2015) in Europe, the fuel efficiency gap is 
becoming wider with time. It has increased from 8% in 2001 to 40% in 2014. New models of 
cars would boast better fuel efficiency numbers in their catalogues but the numbers on the road 
aren’t improving. If the driver’s behavior, road condition and other aspects related to the driver 
or the place and time, are not changing in a way that is negatively affecting real fuel efficiency, 
then this should not be the case.  
Incidents of fuel efficiency test manipulation could offer a possible explanation for the 
widening fuel efficiency gap. Carmakers could be manipulating the catalogue fuel efficiency 
numbers. If this is true then it will lead to the increasing gap between real fuel efficiency and 
catalogue fuel efficiency. There are two famously known incidents of manipulation. The first 
!*(!
is Mitsubishi, which had manipulated the road load test numbers to get better figures in the fuel 
efficiency test. We will refer to this incident as the Mitsubishi scandal from now on. The second 
is Volkswagen, which had installed devices in their vehicles that would detect when it is being 
tested and calibrate the car so that it would give better results on the fuel efficiency test. Those 
could be two isolated cases, but it is still worth it to test the possibility that fuel efficiency 
manipulation is a trend that might include other carmakers as well. In that case the fuel 
efficiency gap will continue to become wider and policymakers and consumers alike might be 
misled when making their decisions if they do not consider that there might be a fuel efficiency 
gap caused by manipulation. 
This study investigates the fuel efficiency gap for Japan using on-road fuel efficiency 
data. The data was obtained from a survey23 asking drivers, who decided to participate, to 
record their car fuel consumption data in a smart phone app which will automatically calculate 
the fuel efficiency number. We have three main goals for this study that can be summarized as 
follows. First, we will try to empirically confirm the Mitsubishi manipulation incident. Second, 
we will determine whether the fuel efficiency gap exist in the Japanese automobile market, and 
if it is getting wider with time. This would allow us to see whether Japan has the same widening 
fuel efficiency gap problem (that was suggested by the T&E research) as Europe, and if so then 
something should be done to address it from a policy standpoint. Finally, we will determine 
whether major carmakers in Japan have a widening fuel efficiency gap by examining the 
relationship between catalogue fuel efficiency and real fuel efficiency for vehicles produced in 
different years. The second and third objective of this study will allow us to know whether fuel 
efficiency manipulation in Japan is a widespread incident or an isolated incident such as the 
case with the Mitsubishi scandal. 
There are several empirical studies that investigate automobile fuel efficiency. Kwon 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'(!Survey done by!IDD, Inc. Group!
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(2005) investigated trends of fleet cars fuel efficiency and new cars fuel efficiency in Great 
Britain. The paper concluded that there is a 10% gap of fuel efficiency between fleet cars and 
new cars. However, this study compares aggregated numbers and the 10% increase in fuel 
efficiency is due to technology advancement and engine size. In our study, we are trying to see 
the gap of the fuel efficiency between laboratory tests and on the road. As this sample is of 
drivers with eco-driving training, it is not an ideal representation for the purposes of an average 
daily driver, of which most are not trained for eco-driving. 
This topic is also related to several papers that focus on manipulation invoked by 
incorrect design of incentives. Ghanem et al (2014) investigated manipulation in self-reported 
data by Chinese cities of daily air pollution concentration. They found that 50% of the cities 
reported dubious air pollution levels. Jacob et al (2003) detected teachers cheating on students 
test scores by looking at unexpected fluctuations in test scores and suspicious patterns of 
answers. They observed that frequency of cheating responds strongly to minor changes in 
incentives. 
This paper contributes to previous literatures in following two ways. First, we develop 
a simple empirical model for detecting fuel efficiency gap over time. In this model will be able 
to check for a widening fuel efficiency gap for the whole sample and for samples of individual 
carmakers. Second, we will use real world fuel efficiency data from a survey conducted by 
IDD, Inc. Group, we will call this survey e-nenpi.24 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we give background 
information on the fuel efficiency gap and manipulation incident. In section 4.3, we introduce 
the data and methodology. In section 4.4, we will present and discuss the results. In the last 
section, we will give concluding remarks. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
')!After the website name of the IDD, Inc. Group survey. The word nenpi means fuel efficiency in Japanese.!
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4.2. Background 
4.2.1. Fuel Efficiency Gap and Manipulation Scandal 
As we have mentioned in the introduction, according to T&E (2015), the fuel efficiency 
gap in Europe had risen from 8% in 2001 to 40% percent in 2014. In addition, the report shows 
how much of the improvement in fuel efficiency in European countries is due to the gap. While 
there is a 35.5 g/km improvement of fuel efficiency, only 13.3 g/km of it is reflected in real 
fuel efficiency, the 22.2 g/km remaining in the improvement made by catalogue fuel efficiency, 
is due to the gap and is not achieved in real on road driving.  
From our data that we obtained from e-nenpi, we can construct a graph showing the 
fuel efficiency gap between the catalogue fuel efficiency and real fuel efficiency as a 
percentage. The fuel efficiency gap in Japan is shown in Figure 4.1. We use data between 2009 
and 2015, each data point is the percentage difference that we calculate using the following 
formula kxy(yfz{|Y}~Yyf~Yyf V>??n. We can see that there is a gap, visually, but we cannot know 
if there is a widening tendency to the gap. Because there are many factors affecting the fuel 
efficiency gap, we cannot discern whether it is due to manipulation or other factors by just 
looking at this figure alone. 
As we have mentioned before, according to T&E (2015), this gap is consistently 
widening in the case of Europe, the reason for that could be that drivers had gotten worse, or 
because of increased traffic congestion, unless we do an empirical analysis we will not know 
for sure. One explanation for the fuel efficiency gap is fuel efficiency manipulation.  
The incentives for carmakers to manipulate is an important factor to this puzzle and to 
understand the reason behind carmakers manipulating we can look at a known manipulation 
case, the Mitsubishi scandal. 
Mitsubishi Motors has announced on April 20th, 2016 that catalogue fuel efficiency of 
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four light motor vehicles were manipulated during testing for fuel efficiency. This was done in 
order to show a higher number than what the vehicles are actually capable of in the catalogue. 
Mitsubishi has admitted that the manipulation started with the 2013 models. The four car 
models are EK Wagon, EK Space, Dayz and Dayz Rooks. The latter two are Nissan models 
manufactured by Mitsubishi. They have estimated that the total number of affected vehicles is 
625 thousand units. Mitsubishi has also estimated that catalogue fuel efficiency of these 
vehicles was manipulated to be 5 to 10 percent better. This incident has sparked rage among 
the consumers who were basing their purchase decision on the catalogue fuel efficiency. This 
is important because car buyers consider the savings from buying fuel efficient vehicle that 
requires less gasoline than other choices in the same category. Also, car buyers who care about 
the environment and want to contribute by emitting less CO2, do factor fuel efficiencies in their 
buying decisions 
Fuel efficiency tests are run by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism (MILT). Because this test is run inside a laboratory, there are many elements from 
driving on a real road that are unaccounted for. Examples of such elements are, wind resistance 
and tire resistance. Mitsubishi, whom like any other carmakers in Japan; estimated the wind 
and tire resistance by doing an in-house road load test, had manipulated those numbers.  
There are many other ways a car manufacturer can manipulate the fuel efficiency test. 
In Europe, both resistance test and laboratory test are done by the manufacturer which can lead 
to even more ways to manipulate the results. The next factor we can look at to know the reason 
why manipulation could be the cause of the fuel efficiency gap are policies aimed at reducing 
CO2 emissions from the transport sector and particularly passenger vehicles. 
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4.2.2. Policy 
As we have mentioned before, the transportation sector is a significant contributor to 
total CO2 emissions in Japan and around the world. Governments in developed countries such 
as the United States, Japan and many European countries have been leaning towards incentivize 
consumers to buy fuel-efficient vehicles. They generally achieve that by subsidizing the vehicle 
purchases and technological advancements in the automobile industry to cut emissions of CO2. 
This had led many governments to implement policies designed to induce carmakers to develop 
vehicles that are fuel-efficient. These incentives range from tax cuts to other non-monetary 
benefits, such as allowing fuel-efficient vehicles to park in premium spots or use high-
occupancy lanes. However, the vehicle must meet certain fuel efficiency requirement in order 
to be eligible to these incentives25. Although the intentions behind these incentives were to 
eventually reduce CO2 emissions, they might have induced the carmakers to manipulate in 
order to meet the requirements of these policies and make their vehicle eligible for such 
benefits. 
As we have detailed in section 2.2, in Japan, in April 2009, a tax cut policy has been 
introduced that gave acquisition and tonnage tax cuts for eligible vehicles on many levels, 
ranging from a 50% cut to a full exemption from taxes. In addition, there were two waves of 
subsidies for vehicles that are eligible. A lump-sum is payed back to the consumers who bought 
vehicle that meets the requirement of the subsidy. If we took the tax cuts as an example and 
look at the requirement from table 2.1, we can see that for low-emission vehicles, which are 
the subject of the topic of this chapter, must 25% above the 2010 fuel efficiency standards. 
This stipulation here might be an incentive for carmakers to manipulate the fuel efficiency test, 
instead of investing in technologically improving the fuel efficiency of their vehicles. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'*!Refer to Tables 2.1 and 2.2 to see example for such requirements in Japan. 
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To sum it all up, the ease in which a carmaker can manipulate fuel efficiency tests 
coupled with the requirement for eligibility of tax cuts and subsidies might encourage 
carmakers to manipulate. This might have created a race in the automobile market to produce 
new vehicle models that emit less CO2 and manipulation could be a part of this race as 
suggested by the T&E research for Europe. 
There are several reasons why manipulation has serious implications for environmental 
policy. First, if catalogue fuel efficiency numbers are used to measure the progress in CO2 
emission abatement from the automobile industry, then these numbers will be very misleading. 
As we have shown, with a fuel efficiency gap that becomes wider each year, most of this 
progress is not actually achieved by drivers on the road and mostly comes from numbers that 
come from the lab tests. vehicles are emitting a lot more on the road that these numbers would 
suggest. Second, consumers consider the fuel efficiency of the vehicle before they purchase it 
and take this number into account. They consider how much they can save by buying a more 
fuel-efficient vehicle or how much they can reduce their CO2 footprint. When this number is 
not reliable, consumers’ choices will not lead to the results they intended. The third reason has 
to do with policy. Many policies have been introduced to induce consumers to buy fuel-
efficient vehicles. Tax cuts, subsidies, special privileges such as high occupancy lane access 
and parking lot access are some examples. These policies have been designed to cut emissions 
of carbon dioxide but with each vehicle emitting more carbon dioxide that advertised for the 
same distance, the goals of these policies will not be met when we look at the total emissions 
cut from on-road driving. The problem is that it is difficult to measure what each driver emits 
on the road and it is easier to just use the catalogue fuel efficiency number when designing 
such policies. But if this number is incorrect or does not reflect real numbers, policymakers 
cannot design adequate policies for their specific goals. 
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4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1. Data 
The data we use for this study is from a comprehensive survey conducted by IDD, Inc. 
Group. The company collects data from voluntary participants who are incentivized to join the 
survey because it will give them detailed information on how they are performing in terms of 
fuel efficiency. Each data point in the survey is collected when a participant visits a gas station 
to refuel and then uses a free application on their smartphone to upload their fuel consumption 
data. Then IDD, Inc. Group will process this information, extract the real fuel efficiency 
numbers and compile it for the survey. The real fuel efficiency number is calculated by using 
the amount of fuel used in the last fueling and dividing it by the distance driven since the last 
fueling visit. With this survey, we can collect information about on-road fuel efficiency 
achieved by drivers. We use this information in conjunction with the catalogue fuel efficiency 
results, from the laboratory test of the same vehicle that the consumer has driven to conduct 
our study. The e-nanpi data has other vehicle information, such as the name of manufacturer, 
model, transmission type and engine displacement as well as driver information such as 
approximation of driving behavior and target fuel efficiency. 
We use the survey data that was compiled in October 2015 for light-motor vehicles. For 
the purposes of this study, light motor vehicles are the most susceptible to fuel efficiency 
manipulation such as the case of the Mitsubishi scandal, therefore we think using light motor 
vehicles is sufficient for this analysis. It is important to note that, every data point in our sample 
represents a refueling visit by a customer in the month of October of 2015, different refueling 
visit in the same period of time by the same customer are treated as different data points. 
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4.3.2. Methodology 
The method used for the estimation is IV OLS. We use real fuel efficiency as our 
dependent variable. The model is represented as follows: 
 
 W%$! ) ,L + ,-;$=$!4p<% + ,2;$=$!4p<%V907% + ,5;$=$!4p<%V907%VM+ ,8;$=$!4p<%V907%V\$P%/ + ,8 + ,@S + R!
 
 
Here, W%$! is the on-road fuel efficiency of a vehicle in a data point. It is measured by 
kilometers per liter of gasoline consumption (km/l). U;$=$!4p<% , is the fuel efficiency 
advertised in the catalogue of a vehicle. This is the fuel efficiency attained from the laboratory 
test. 907%, is a variable that indicates the year of the production of the vehicle. In this data, we 
have vehicle production years that dates from 1990 to 2015. All of the vehicles in our dataset 
are from October of 2015, but the production date is what varies. For example, we can have 
the real fuel efficiency in October of 2015 of a vehicle that was produced in the year 2000. The W%$! variable will reflect this vehicle’s real fuel efficiency in October of 2015 and the 907% 
variable will reflect that this vehicle was produced in the year 2000. M, is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for the Mitsubishi scandal vehicles and 0 otherwise. \$P%/, is a vector 
of dummy variables, each indicating vehicles from a certain carmaker. For example, the 
dummy variable 0&&$", takes the value of 1 for vehicles produced by Nissan and 0 otherwise. 
We decided to use 4"F$ as the base category for this vector of dummy variables. We chose 4"F$ as the base because Honda vehicles have the highest real fuel efficiency on average for 
this sample which makes it easier to compare the other carmaker dummies. The approach we 
take here helps us figure out many of the question that we posed in this chapter. The coefficient 
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,-tells us the relationship between real and catalogue fuel efficiency. Here we expect that a 
portion of the advertised catalogue efficiency is achieved on road, so this coefficient would be 
less that one and more than zero. The coefficient ,2 shows whether a fuel efficiency gap exist 
in the Japanese automobile market. It also shows whether the gap is widening or not. Since we 
interact the fuel efficiency with the production year of the vehicle, if the portion of catalogue 
fuel efficiency that is achieved on-road is getting less and less (the coefficient is negative) then 
a gap exists. Next, for ,5 and ,8, we interact the catalogue and time variables with the EK 
dummy variable and the Makers dummy variables respectively. The former shows us the 
manipulation incident empirically and the latter shows us whether a fuel efficiency gap exists 
for each carmaker individually, just like how ,2 shows us the fuel efficiency gap for the entire 
sample.  , is a vector of vehicle-variant variables. This includes Transmission, a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the vehicle has manual transmission and 0 otherwise; Eco-
Mode, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the vehicle has an eco-driving mode and 
taking the value of 0 otherwise; and Turbo-Mode, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
the vehicle has a turbo driving mode and 0 otherwise. An Eco-driving mode makes the vehicle 
more fuel efficient on the expense of horsepower and Turbo-driving mode makes the vehicle 
perform better in terms of horsepower on the expense of fuel-efficiency. S, is a vector of user-
variant variables. This includes level of care, a vector of three dummy variables that indicates 
whether the user takes good care of his or her vehicle. The first of these three dummy variables 
are Good Care, this variable takes the value of 1 if the user chooses the first option (good care) 
in a question in the survey asking if he or she takes good, moderate or bad care of their vehicle 
and 0 otherwise, the second dummy variable is Bad Care and it takes the value of 1 if the user 
answers the same question with the answer bad care, and the third is Moderate Care and it takes 
the value of 1 if the user answered as moderate care. The Moderate Care dummy variable is 
used as the base for this vector of dummy variables. The level of care dummy variables are 
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subjective but we decided to keep them in our estimation even if it will only serve as an 
approximation of the customers driving behaviour. The user-variant variables also include 
Target fuel efficiency and Odometer, both measured by km/l. The Target fuel efficiency is 
what the user aims to achieve as a fuel efficiency when driving his/her specific vehicle and 
Odometer is how many km/l the specific vehicle of the data point has been driven. Lastly, 
Gasoline price is included as a control variable, it is measured by yen per liter. We include 
gasoline price because it could affect driving behavior. If gasoline prices are high, drivers tend 
to make an effort to drive more efficiently and in term affecting the real fuel efficiency number.  
In the equation above we have an interesting relation between real fuel efficiency and 
catalogue fuel efficiency. We use catalogue fuel efficiency as a determinant for real fuel 
efficiency. This makes sense in theory but there is a problem with that approach. We know that 
consumers who want to emit less would choose vehicles that have a high rating of catalogue 
fuel efficiency. Therefore, Real fuel efficiency also affects catalogue fuel efficiency. Consumer 
who achieve higher fuel efficiency tend to buy vehicles with higher catalogue fuel efficiency. 
In that sense catalogue fuel efficiency is correlated with a missing variable, which is captured 
by the error term. This violates one of the classic conditions for OLS, leading to biased 
estimates of coefficients. Therefore, we use IV OLS and find an instrument that is correlated 
with catalogue efficiency but is not chosen by the consumer. The instrument we use is the 
laboratory test method. In Japan, there are two methods for testing a vehicles fuel efficiency, 
these pertain to the laboratory test done by the MILT and not to the road load test done by the 
manufacturers. The two methods are called 10・15 and JC80.  
JC80 is the newer method. It is slightly stricter that 10・15. Most cars have been tested 
in both methods but some have been tested by one or the other. As the test methods are 
exogenous and consumers have no choice in which method is used to test the cars, we thought 
that this is a fitting instrument to use in our model. We created a dummy variable indicating 
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which method was used to test the vehicle, for vehicles which are tested by both methods we 
randomly chose one of the methods and assigned a 1 or a 0 for it in the dummy variable 
depending on which one it was. We will run an IV OLS regression separately for each year and 
compare the results. In the next section, we will present the results of the regressions. 
We expect the EK interaction term to be positive. We know that vehicles included in 
EK have manipulated fuel efficiencies. After controlling for catalogue fuel efficiency EK 
dummy variable vehicles will have less real fuel efficiency compared to other vehicles. There 
is no expected sign for the maker interaction term as there is no indication that a fuel efficiency 
gap exists in any of them off the bat. If we get negative coefficient then this will prove that the 
fuel efficiency gap exists in the Japanese market, and that is what this study is aiming to do. 
We will also run the same regression without using instrumental variable (OLS instead of IV 
OLS) to robust check the results we get. 
 
4.4. Results and Discussion 
The main result is shown in table 4.2 under IV OLS Model 1 and IV OLS Model 2. 
This result is from the IV OLS model and includes the vehicle and user control variables. The 
catalogue coefficient is 0.255 and significant at 1% level. This suggests that, controlling for 
other variables that affect the on-road fuel efficiency, drivers are seeing 0.255 km/liter for each 
1 km/l advertised in the catalogue. This will serve as the natural difference between real and 
catalogue fuel efficiency that are not captured by the other variables in the model. On average 
25.5% of catalogue fuel efficiency is achieved on the road. First let’s look at the catalogue 
interaction with time variable. The coefficient is 0.0003 and significant at the 1% level. This 
suggest that a fuel efficiency gap does not exist in the Japanese automobile market, since 
negative values for this coefficient (,2), indicate that for each 1 km/l in the catalogue fuel 
efficiency real fuel efficiency is achieving less and less of it with time. In contrast, positive 
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values of this coefficient indicate an improvement of on-road fuel efficiency for each 1 km/l of 
catalogue fuel efficiency year over year. Since we got positive values for ,2, we can at least 
refute a widening fuel efficiency gap for our sample. The EK interaction variable is -0.0015 
and significant at the 1% level. This empirically confirms the manipulation incident since it is 
negative. As for the other carmakers, they are either positive and significant or negative and 
insignificant. This suggest that the EK incident is the only case of manipulation and a fuel 
efficiency gap does not exist for any of the other carmakers. We obtained similar results in the 
OLS model shown under OLS Model 1 and OLS Model 2 in table 4.2. One difference between 
the IV OLS Models and OLS Models is that in OLS Model 2, we see that there is a fuel 
efficiency gap for our sample of the Japanese market as indicated by the coefficient for 
catalogue fuel efficiency interacted with time. The coefficient her is -0.00155 and is significant 
at the 1% level. However, this is the only sign of a widening fuel efficiency gap and since we 
consider the OLS Model to be inferior to the IV OLS Model, we do not think that this result is 
a sufficient evidence for a fuel efficiency gap. 
If we return and answer our main three questions here from these results, we can see 
that the manipulation incident is indeed empirically confirmed. However, we could not find 
strong evidence of a widening fuel efficiency gap for the whole sample nor for any individual 
carmaker. This suggests that in the case of our sample from the Japanese automobile industry, 
unlike what the T&E research suggested for Europe, the Mitsubishi manipulation incident is 
an isolated case and not a widespread phenomenon.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Fuel efficiency for the vehicles on the market that are obtained from lab tests, gauge 
the technological advancement and progress made in the automobile industry. Also, 
governments have many policies designed to incentivize such technological advancement 
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based of fuel efficiency numbers from lab test results. In addition, consumers in this day and 
age are becoming more and more aware of the environment and how fuel-efficient vehicles 
contribute to CO2 abatement. Many consumers care about fuel cost saving from buying fuel-
efficient vehicles. Considering all these factors, the fuel efficiency number written in the 
catalogue of the vehicle is an important for vehicle purchasing decisions for consumer and 
policymaking decisions. If the fuel efficiency numbers were manipulated then neither 
government could devise good policies, nor consumers could make sound vehicle buying 
decision. From our analysis, we could not confirm a widening fuel efficiency gap in the 
Japanese automobile market. A widening fuel efficiency gap could be evidence for fuel 
efficiency data manipulation. This suggests that the manipulation incident that happened in 
Japan is an isolated case. Considering the importance of stopping fuel efficiency manipulation, 
and the ease of manipulating lab test results. Having the Mitsubishi scandal happen might be a 
good thing in general for the consumers and government. It acts as a cautionary tale for other 
carmakers to not engage in such practices.  
Since we have found no evidence of a widening fuel efficiency gap in our sample, then 
we can conclude that the Japanese automobile industry does not have an apparent and 
widespread fuel efficiency data manipulation problem. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics!
!
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Real Fuel 
Efficiency 
(KM/L) 
15.373 3.747 3 45496 127556 
Catalogue Fuel 
Efficiency 
(KM/L) 
21.173           4.65 409500 6103650 127556 
Time 17.019 5.793 1 26 127556 
EK Dummy 0.027 0.163 0 1 127556 
Suzuki 0.313                0.464 0 1 127556 
Subaru 0.098 0.298 0 1 127556 
Daihatsu 0.287 0.452 0 1 127556 
Toyota 0.006 0.076 0 1 127556 
Mazda 0.034 0.181 0 1 127556 
Mitsubishi 0.062 0.241 0 1 127556 
Nissan 0.033 0.18 0 1 127556 
Good Care 0.675 0.468 0 1 127556 
Bad Care 0.059 0.236 0 1 127556 
Target Fuel 
Efficiency 
(KM/L) 
16.225 4.874 7 99 127556 
Turbo Dummy 0.411 0.492 0 1 127556 
Manual 
Dummy 
0.641 0.48 0 1 127556 
Eco Dummy 0.183 0.387 0 1 127556 
Odometer 
(KM) 
75425.56 61714.23 30 528961 127556 
Gasoline Price 
(Yen/L) 
103.683 16.927 0 1526 127556 
Fuel Efficiency 
Test Method 
0.295 0.456 0 1 127556 
!
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Table 4.2: IV Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
Variable IV OLS Model 1 IV OLS Model 2 OLS Model 1 OLS Model 2 
Const 3.379*** (10.62) 
6.556*** 
(26.43) 
3.007*** 
(18.66) 
4.756*** 
(85.31) 
Catalogue Fuel 
Fuel Efficiency (;) 0.255*** (11.72) 0.385*** (20.20) 0.285*** (46.97) 0.523*** (124.90) ; V Time (=) 0.00137*** (3.59) 0.00123** (3.17) 0.000875*** (7.33) -0.00155*** (-14.02) 
EKV;V= -0.00151*** (-15.11) -0.00180*** (-18.01) -0.00151*** (-15.13) -0.00182*** (-18.17) 
SuzukiV;V= 0.000872*** (13.47) 0.00107*** (15.54) 0.000840*** (13.94) 0.000847*** (13.57) 
SubaruV;V= -0.00000843 (-0.08) 0.00179*** (14.88) -0.0000484 (-0.50) 0.00129*** (12.87) 
DaihatsuV;V= 0.0000224 (0.28) 0.000304*** (3.65) -0.0000452 (-0.72) -0.0000784 (-1.20) 
ToyotaV;V= -0.000142 (-0.94) 0.000311 (1.72) -0.000159 (-1.04) 0.000102 (0.58) 
MazdaV;V= 0.000585*** (4.86) 0.000848*** (6.95) 0.000533*** (4.71) 0.000539*** (4.70) 
MitsubishiV;V= 0.00131*** (9.21) 0.0000666 (0.45) 0.00128*** (9.12) 0.0000425 (0.29) 
NissanV;V= 0.000536*** (4.15) 0.000917*** (6.80) 0.000562*** (4.42) 0.000960*** (7.20) 
Good Care -0.114*** (-6.09) - 
-0.108*** 
(-5.88) - 
Bad Care 0.0026 (0.07) - 
0.00225 
(0.06) - 
Target Fuel 
Efficiency 
0.245*** 
(25.00) - 
0.243*** 
(24.73) - 
Turbo Dummy -0.380*** (-10.39) - 
-0.337*** 
(-18.10) - 
Manual Dummy 1.234*** (31.21) - 
1.194*** 
(49.07) - 
Eco Dummy -0.262*** (-6.44) - 
-0.297*** 
(-9.21) - 
Odometer 0.00000802*** (38.92) - 
0.00000789*** 
(44.73) - 
Gasoline Price 0.00840*** (6.12) - 
0.00836*** 
(6.12) - 
Number of Obs 127556 127556 115231 127556 
R-squared 0.4661 0.3477 0.4663 0.3537 
*** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10% level 
Note: Catalogue fuel efficiency is indicated by ;, and Time is indicated by = 
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Figure 4.1: The Gap Between Real Fuel Efficiency and Catalogue Fuel Efficiency 
Note: Gap percentage = kxy(yfz{|Y}~Yyf~Yyf V>??n 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined three main topics. First, we examined the effect of tax 
incentives on environment-friendly vehicles. Second, we studied the relationship between 
charging infrastructure and electric vehicles, and how increasing the number of charging 
infrastructure could alleviate the anxiety from short range that is negatively affecting the sales 
of electric vehicles. Lastly, we focused on fuel efficiency data manipulations and whether there 
is a fuel efficiency gap in the Japanese automobile market or not.  
In this paper, through our main three topics, we learned that in the Japanese automobile 
market, tax cuts are highly effective, especially tax exemptions that target hybrid-electric 
vehicles. The subsidy program had a positive effect on the sales of environment-friendly 
vehicles, however, it was less effective that the tax cuts. Therefore, it might be more effective 
for the government to focus on tax cuts and less on subsidies in the Japanese automobile 
market. One limitation of this analysis is that we do not take into account that the tax incentives 
might have subsidized consumer who were planning to buy environment-friendly vehicles 
anyway. According to Chandra et al (2010), there is a free rider problem in the case of the 
Canadian automobile market. They found that rebate programs mostly subsidized consumers 
planning to buy hybrid-electric vehicles anyway. They also conclude that the rebate program 
could have been designed to diffuse the hybrid-electric technology through taking advantage 
of the economies of scale effect. However, the small numbers of hybrid-electric vehicles sold 
in Canada does not warrant the scale effect as an advantage of the tax rebate. A portion of the 
positive effect of tax incentives on the sales in our paper might have due to the free rider 
problem noted in the Chandra et al (2010). On the other hand, unlike the case of the Canadian 
market, we see some signs of a positive scale effect that might have been caused by the 2006 
tax incentives as 26 out of the 30-top selling models were environment-friendly vehicles by 
2013. We also learned that increasing the number charging infrastructure, especially fast 
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charging stations could have a positive effect on the sales of electric vehicles. However, the 
policy introduced by the government to subsidize the cost of building a charging station by 
covering half of the cost (raised to two thirds later), can be considered an expensive measure 
when comparing its abatement cost to the estimated cost of representative measures of reducing 
CO2. This cost-effectiveness issue in our analysis is conditional on the stock number of electric 
vehicles that are owned by consumers and changing that number could have an economies of 
scale effect where it becomes comparable to other measures of abatement cost. Lastly, our 
results show that for light motor vehicles sold in 2015, drivers achieved 0.26 km/l for every 1 
km/l achieved in the fuel efficiency lab test, while controlling for other factors. However, when 
we examined whether there was an increasing fuel efficiency gap between real fuel efficiency 
and catalogue fuel efficiency over time, we could not find any evidence of that for the Japanese 
automobile market. We also looked at each carmaker individually to find whether they have 
an increasing fuel efficiency gap throughout the years and we could not find evidence that a 
fuel efficiency gap exists for any of the carmakers. We were able to confirm the Mitsubishi 
fuel efficiency scandal in our results but couldn’t find any similar pattern to it for any of the 
other carmakers. 
 As we mentioned in the beginning of this paper, with governments in developed 
countries becoming more aware of the need to reduce CO2 emissions and turning to the 
transport sector and environment-friendly vehicles to achieve CO2 emission cuts. There are 
many options available for such programs that promote the sales of environment-friendly 
vehicles. From what we learned in Japan, we know that tax cuts are essential for the sales of 
environment-friendly vehicles and that without a sufficient charging infrastructure, electric 
vehicles might not be competitive in the market. Also, if governments want to promote 
environment-friendly vehicles, it is important to check for the difference between real and 
catalogue efficiency and whether there is any manipulation regarding testing for fuel 
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efficiency, especially since most policies, such as the tax cuts in Japan use catalogue fuel 
efficiency as a basis for which vehicle should be eligible for the tax cuts. If fuel efficiency 
manipulation becomes a widespread practice, government projections for its transport sector 
abatement programs would not be reliable anymore since they rely mostly on catalogue fuel 
efficiency data. Also, consumers’ buying decisions based on catalogue fuel efficiency would 
be misguided and most of the intended environmentalist behavior by the green consumer 
through driving an environment-friendly vehicle would be lost. 
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